Why Gaddafi? -- the U.S. and the March of Folly

Why Gaddafi? -- the U.S. and the March of Folly

By David Bukay, March 27, 2011

[Reproduced here by kind permission of the author]

http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/03/why_gaddafi_the_us_and_the_mar.html

At the beginning of her highly acclaimed bestseller, The March of Folly, Barbara Tuchman asserts the following:

A phenomenon noticeable throughout history regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests. Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity

The U.S. administration under President Obama has proven no exception.  Obama's domestic agenda may be dictatorial, but his foreign policy is exactly the opposite: appeasing, oblivious, hesitant, and undetermined.  This means that our world -- an anarchical world where might makes right and disorder and instability reign -- is left with no one to make order out of all the chaos.  

The anarchic disruption in the Middle East signals the advent of forces which could result in a sweeping victory of Islam over the rest of the world.  And the Middle East crises of 2011 have brought neither honor nor respect to the U.S.  The ill-named "Arab Spring of Nations" -- which advocates more chaos and anarchy, not democracy -- has led Washington to spout many confused and contradictory messages.  Through its confused policy of first doing nothing and then doubling down on what is wrong, the U.S. under Obama has lost not only its credibility, but also its ability to work out a comprehensive policy for a better world.

Perhaps one might say that the last thing the US administration wanted was to open a new front against Islam.  Perhaps it would have been convenient for the U.S. to leave the leading role in the Libyan crisis to France and Britain.  Perhaps this is the reason for the war coalition the U.S. has organized against Libya, and perhaps the U.S. still very much wishes to see as many Arab states participating in the war against Gaddafi as possible.  But without a coherent message from Washington, none of these guesses can be confirmed.  And the American president is no help.  Obama has continually reversed his mistaken policy just to reverse it again...and always in the wrong direction.

The question is this: why Gaddafi's Libya?  If the military operation aims to punish oppressive patrimonial leaders like Gaddafi, then this policy should be applied to just about every Middle Eastern leader.  What makes Gaddafi worse than other Middle-Eastern leaders who butcher and massacre their own people -- some of them leaders with regimes even harsher and more oppressive?  Are the U.S. and the European states sure that the Gaddafi's opposition is any better than Gaddafi himself concerning Libyan politics?  That Gaddafi is a reprehensible leader does not automatically turn his opposition into credible, reliable democrats worthy of American support.

It is crucial to identify the central and unique role of the ruler in ME politics.  History and current Arab-Islamic political culture clearly demonstrate that the strong, coercive, oppressive, and even brutal leader is a pervasive phenomenon.  Take him out, and you weaken the regime, whereupon anarchy prevails.  This is the history of the ME, established by Arab tribal politics and institutionalized by Islam.  It is shown by this Arab proverb: "better forty years of tyrannical coercive rule than one day without a ruler."

Cries for "democracy" notwithstanding, is the U.S. considering the possibility that those who follow the current Middle-Eastern despots be perhaps worse concerning human rights and freedom?  What if the opposition is radical Islamists or anarchists -- will the U.S. return to Libya to make amends?  What if in reality the rebels are tribalists or jihadists, or regionalists cornered in Cyrenaica who wish to cleave Libya into two states?  Is it not true that the U.S. fighting Gaddafi encourages all manner of anti-democratic opposition forces to rise up against their respective regimes?

The legal perspective here is important, if only to expose how Obama administration operates.  American military operations stem from the Constitution and are meant to be authorized by the Congress.  (The U.N. Security Council has no standing in these matters.)  Obama's war on Libya, for its part, has no basis in the U.S. Constitution.  Obama said on March 19:

I authorized the Armed Forces of the United States to begin a limited military action in Libya in support of an international effort to protect Libyan civilians. That action has now begun. In this effort, the United States is acting with a broad coalition that is committed to enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which calls for the protection of the Libyan people.

The West says that the goal of military operations is not to overthrow Gaddafi; as U.S. Vice Admiral William Gortney has promised, the objective is to "deny the Libyan regime from using force against its own people."  Yet the imposition of a no-fly zone and attacks against Libya's command-and-control centers are not out of the question, and these could easily lead to an invasion and occupation of Libya.  The goal, unspoken but well-understood, is regime change -- displacing Gaddafi's regime and replacing it with a new one built around the rebels.

James V. Capua in "Obama and the Libya decision" claims that Barack Obama finally has a war he can believe in.  The war may indeed be Obama's personal interest, but is it in the U.S.'s best interest?  Is it morally right and politically justified?

In 1991, the U.S. led an impressive international coalition for a just cause with an important message.  In 2011, the U.S. is half-dragging a much smaller coalition into nebulous and morally questionable operations.  That is why the editor of al-Sharq al-Awsat has declared that "[t]he U.S. has no clear picture of Middle East situation; in her statements, Clinton sounds more like the Iranian Foreign Minister than like the U.S. [Secretary of State]."  In the words of Caroline Glick (Jerusalem Post, March 22, 2011), America is embarking on a "descent into strategic dementia."

While a Western-led military intervention in Libya is dominating the headlines, the crisis in Yemen is rapidly escalating, and its implications for stability in the Persian Gulf should turn heads.  Yemen, like Libya, is a tribal society at its core, with a regime dependent on the tribal framework.  Protests intensified dramatically across Yemen as tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the town squares to demand the resignation of President Saleh.  With key military and political figures defecting to the opposition, Yemen is falling into a state of utter crisis that threatens its political existence.

Meanwhile, strategists identify Bahrain as prime target for covert takeover by Iran.  King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa said that a foreign plot against his kingdom had been foiled, and he thanked troops brought in from neighboring countries to help suppress the increasing unrest.  He also declared that Bahrain has arrested opposition leaders who support foreign countries.

It is clear enough that Saudi Arabia is a target for destabilization by Iran, with the latter nation fomenting unrest in eastern and southern Arabia (Bahrain and Yemen, respectively).  In fact, most Gulf States are arming and preparing for major war with Iran, with Bahrain being perceived as the first target on Iran's map.

The United States' Libyan adventure might exacerbate tension and increase turmoil throughout the Middle East.  Perhaps it has slipped the Obama administration's mind, but regime changes in the Middle East can beget only three winners: the various Muslim Brotherhood groups, Iran, and al-Qaeda.  These three entities dominate the map, from North Africa in the west through Sudan and Yemen to the Persian Gulf in the east.  This means that Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the two principal enemies of both Iran and al-Qaeda, are surrounded -- and there are already clear signs of increasing power, influence, and activities among the Islamist movements in the Arab states.     

It appears that the U.S. is promoting the interests of Iran and al-Qaeda, if perhaps unintentionally.  The Obama administration's march of folly could well effect the Talibanization of the Middle East, with the consequent miasma of feuding tribes and clans -- or even worse, a horrific Shiite-Sunni political-religious struggle for regional hegemony.  In this Sunni-Shiite apocalypse, Iran consistently expands its influence and enlarges its axis of evil to include Syria and Turkey, and then Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority.

This is where the Gulf States expect U.S. intervention and assistance.  This is why the situation in Yemen must attract the U.S. to the strategically crucial Horn of Africa.  This is why Saudi Arabia and Egypt are in need of political support against their enemies, from Iran to al-Qaeda.

But President Obama would rather visit Brazil than pay these issues any mind.

February 16, 2011

Egypt's Putative Revolution

By David Bukay

[Reproduced here by kind permission of the author]

The demonstrations and riots erupted through Egypt, were neither a revolution (a total change in all political, social and economic realms), nor a rebellion (a mass movement upheaval). However, they were an excuse of an successful internal coup d'état within the military regime, perpetrated by Tantawi, the Defense Minister against Mubarak. The main reason is that the military elite was never in love with the idea of having Mubarak's son, Gamal, take over the presidency.  All that Egypt's 18-day uprising produced, is a change within the regime.  Egypt is returning to the 1952 model of direct rule, and the question is to what extent the military elite will share power with any civilian counterparts in the future.

The troika of the military regime to succeed Mubarak has been set. It includes the former Air Force chief, Ahmed Shafiq, as Prime Minister; the Defense Minister, Muhammad Hussein al-Tantawi, as the strong leader; and the Chief of General Staff, Sami Hafiz `Annan. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is the highest executive body, headed by Tantawi, and takes control of the governmental decision-making. Two conspicuous signs to this trend will be the increase in the budgets given to the Egyptian army; and the appointing of more generals in uniform to the governmental ministries.

However, what is surprising in the Egyptian situation is that the international community has suddenly discovered that the regimes in the Middle East are authoritarian, corrupt, and anti-democratic. Well, this is the exact situation, and has been since a long time ago. What is not surprising however is the deep involvement of the media, which has inflated the extent of the demonstrations; exceedingly distorted the figures; and painted the events in the streets with romantic colors.

So, it is not the "Papyrus Revolution," but the "al-Jazeera Revolution;" and ElBaradei, a man of nothing, was already coronated by CNN as the next Egyptian president. The media has created, with one collective voice, a virtual reality and al-Tahrir Square has become the stage. The protesters were dubbed true democrats, moderate and peace-loving.  The mantra that Egyptians want freedom and democracy has swept the world.  All ignored the reality: Just because people protest something, does not mean they are democracy-loving moderates.

However, when the Technicolor dust settles to earth, world public opinion will discover that the military regime stays in power; that the Egyptian military appoints another of its own to replace Mubarak; and perhaps even worse, that the military turns to direct rule, which means more oppressive and un-democratic measures. The important question is whether there is a regime change, or only change within the regime?

Actually, the only alternative to the military regime in Egypt is the Islamists in power. The Muslim Brotherhood can take the reins of government based only on two strict conditions: a) provided the military steps out of politics, and b) provided free real democratic elections are made. One has to recall Samuel Huntington's assertion: if you really give the Arab-Muslim free and democratic choice in elections, he will vote, with high probability, for the Islamic groups. The reason is because he cherishes Islam and knows it intimately; and because he believes it bears the only solution to his problems, compared to all the foreign ideologies and structures that have failed.

Three possible models stand for the Ikhwan in politics:

• the "Turkish model:" an Islamist party in power that advances slowly and gradually but steadily toward the goal of Islamizing the state;
• the "Algerian model:" a direct Islamic rule that exacerbates the situation and strengthens the military objection, which may lead to a civil war;
• the "Lebanese model:" Hezb'allh's example of controlling the political system behind the screen, through non-Islamist politicians and political alliances. For all practical purposes, the Ikhwan will probably prefer the Lebanese model.

What are the immediate conclusions from the Egyptian events?

The outstanding phenomenon with far-reaching consequences is that Arab-Islamic fear barrier has been broken; perhaps forever. The people are no longer afraid of the regime. This is an important lesson: The Arab people have become a political player.

The new spirit waving in the Arab-Islamic Middle East is the need of the rulers to listen to the people; to be attentive to their needs. This is a meaningful revolution in the Arab-Islamic polity. That is to say that a civil society is growing.

The international media plays a decisively important role. It directly intervenes in the events and takes clear side. This has very negative ramifications, but should be taken as a given. 

The internet, Facebook and Twitter, has become a mirror of reality, so that no regime can hide behind the screen.  It is the alternative means of people to organize, to mobilize, and to cooperate.

There is a change in the international system's operation. For the first time it openly and publicly takes side in the internal affairs of other states. This is a kind of political intervention that bears significant consequences of world reality.

The Middle East is marching toward an additional round of political instability and threats, generated especially by the violent activity of the Islamic opposition, and the rising political demands of the people. This is perhaps the most important issue to study.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be put in proportion and perspective. It is the least important compare to all other issues in the Middle East.

The US administration has to consider that Egypt serves as a watershed and a milestone. President Obama happily praised the events in Egypt and compared them to the Berlin Wall and Gandhi inspiration. He has reiterated that "we are witnessing a history in creation." Well, all we can wish is that it will not be a history in recapitulation of Iran of 1979, and even the events that led to the eruption of the two World Wars. Therefore, it is recommended that the US:  

• bear in mind what happened in Iran in 1979, when the people demanded freedom and they received Khomeini;
• bear in mind what happened in Algeria after the free elections at the beginning of 1992, when the Islamic movement won, and the military intervened in an ongoing civil war that caused tens of thousands of people killed;
• bear in mind what happened in Lebanon in March 2005, when the people demanded freedom, however, Hizbullah outmaneuvered the Prime Minister from November 2009, Sa`d Hariri, to complete the Lebanon takeover;
• bear in mind what happened after the US pressures for free elections in the PA, in January 2006, and Hamas won out and is now running Gaza;
• bear in mind what happened in Pakistan in February 2008, after the US insisted upon promoting democratic elections that caused Benazir Bhutto's murder and the rise of the Mujahidin and Taliban to control large parts of Pakistan.

The US should support the military, although it is authoritarian and coercive and even prevents the advancement of democracy. It must do so because the alternative is the embodiment of evil, and represents the abuse of all we love and cherish, of all democratic life.

David Bukay is at the School of Political Science, The University of Haifa

Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/02/egypts_putative_revolution.html at March 20, 2011 - 05:00:42 PM CDT

February 20, 2011

The Egyptian Army in Politics

By David Bukay

[Reproduced here by kind permission of the author]

Egypt is a praetorian state.  By praetorianⁱ, one refers to a society with high amounts of military politicization in the political, social, and economic strata.  Practically, the praetorian state is characterized by high intervention and involvement of the military in the politics.

From July 23, 1952 on, the Egyptian political leadership has come from the military.  It was started as a coup d'étatⁱⁱ, which means the military takes the reins of the government by violent and unconstitutional acts and that the important political roles of the regime are occupied by military officers, who are in charge of the decision-making processes.

The Egyptian army remains the only important institution and stable political elite in the country.  The army bears the title of July 1952 liberator from the corrupt monarchical regime and the title of October 1973 liberator by restoring Sinai and overall Egyptian honor.  Moreover, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak were the first rulers in millennia to be native-born Egyptians.  This has added to not only the Egyptians' national pride, but also the persistence of the military in Egyptian politics.  At the beginning, Egypt was operated under direct military rule, but over the years it became more civilianized and open.  Unfortunately, Egypt today is returning to direct military rule, and all circumstances clearly show that the military will not relinquish its place in politicsⁱⁱⁱ.  

The Egyptian political system is an authoritarian regime and a patrimonial leadership.  By authoritarianism^iv, one refers to the following traits: a) central role of the military in politics; b) limited political pluralism; c) personal leadership; d) an absence of a guiding ideology; and e) lack of political mobilization and participation.

By patrimonial leadership^v, one refers to the following traits: a) the state is the exclusive property of the ruler, and the patron is the merciful father of the nation; b) the ruler holds unlimited power, introduced by worship via a cult of personality; c) military power is at the disposal of the leader; d) clientelist politics, with informal decision-making process that yields nepotism and corruption, dominate decision-making; and e) the political processes and institutions are informal and weak and encourage disorder and political decay.

Although a military regime may lead to processes of civilianization, it does not guarantee the creation of a civil society^vi, which is made up of non-state participants and non-governmental organizations.  In Egypt, for example, there are political parties and professional associations, but Egypt lacks the essence of civil society, since one still must wonder about the nation's maturity and the extent of its influence and effectiveness.  

Military regimes^vii constitute clear majorities of two-thirds in the non-Western world and of one half in Africa.  In the mid-1980s, half of the Islamic states and 60 percent of the Arab states were under direct military rule^viii.  In other Arab states (most of them monarchical), the army was the guardian and the sole power of the regime^ix.  Military regimes are marked by weak political institutions -- that is to say low institutionalization and a high concentration of political corruption.  Operatively, such a political system tends to lead to arbitrary centralized governmental leadership that maximizes the role of the military in politics.  The policy this resultant regime adopts tends to be coercive and violent, withholding individual freedoms and civil rights^x.

Usually, what characterizes a military regime is a crisis of authority, legitimacy, and participation, which causes internal conflicts and prevents political stability^xi.  This is the reason why there is also a huge lag in democracy in Egypt, as in all other Arab-Islamic polities, since patrimonialism makes authoritarian regimes resistant to and deliberately ignorant of democracy^xii.  However, it is a mistake to describe the military regime in Egypt as even a quasi-democracy^xiii.  It is at best a civilianized military regime, but its functioning is far from democracy.

Democracy is not made of elections alone -- nor of parliaments, nor even of political parties.  Democracy^xiv is much more, and its important ingredients are a) individual freedoms and civil liberties (most prominent among them freedom of expression); b) prevalence of the rule of the law above all else (and this includes the separation and balancing of powers); c) sovereignty and citizenship empowered by the people, equality, and egalitarianism, including the rights of minorities; d) the centrality of stable political institutions, and the existence of civil society; e) vertical and horizontal accountability, operated by means of eligibility, responsiveness, and transparency of ruling systems; f) mobility, political participation, equality of opportunity, and multiple mature and effective political parties.

He who wishes to adopt and promote a ripe, sustainable, enduring democracy has to critically admit that almost all of these requisite qualities are fatally missing in the Arab-Islamic polity.  This situation is well-analyzed by Larbi Sadiki, who denotes that although there are parties, elections, and parliaments in the Arab states, the way they are implemented precludes true democracy^xv.

One of the main reasons for this failure to adopt democracy is Islam. Although the military regimes are considered secular, their constitutions in toto emphasize that the religion of the state is Islam.  This constitutes a huge impediment to true democracy, since in Islam, the source of authority, sovereignty, and the rule of law is Allah alone.  Everything stems fromAllah and his will, and the believer acts out of absolute submission, surrender, and devotion to Allah.  In a true democracy, by contrast, man is the focus, and logic is at the center.  The justification for any conduct is rationality, pluralism, and free choice, and fair judgment.  In Islam, there is no citizenship, nor is man the sovereign.

Islam and democracy are mutually exclusive.  Democracy cannot simultaneously stay true to itself and accept Allah's values of rule and sovereignty in all spheres of life.  Similarly, where the only source of law is the shari'ah, there is no need for democracy, which is based on man's laws and contradicts Allah's.  The concept of majority rule, like all other conceptions of democracy, cannot exist in Islam.  Islam purportedly includes the whole of human wisdom to the end of history, so not only is it perfect and unchangeable, but under Islam, accepting Western values is forbidden and tantamount to apostasy. 

A Pew Research poll published in June 2010 proves illustrative.  According to the poll, 95% of the Egyptian public would welcome Islamic politics, 84% support the death penalty for those who leave Islam, 82% favor stoning people who commit adultery, 77% favor whipping/cutting off of hands for theft and robbery, 59% side with Muslim fundamentalists, and only 27% side with the modernizers.  Furthermore, 54% believe suicide bombings can be justified, and 52% support Hamas.  And 82% of Egyptians dislike the U.S. -- the highest unfavorable rating among the eighteen Muslim nations Pew surveyed.

Notes

i Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: the Praetorian State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.

ⁱⁱ J.S. Fitch, The Military Coup d'état as a political process. Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press, 1977. Edward Luttwak, Coup d'état: a Practical Handbook. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

ⁱⁱⁱ T. Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal from Politics. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987.

^iv Amos Perlmutter, Modern Authoritarianism: a Comparative Institutional Analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

^v Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

^vi Peter Odell, Civil Society, Oxford: Hart, 2008.

^vii Erik Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coup and Government. Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1977.  

^viii S. Qureishi, "Military in the Polity of Islam: Religion as a Basis for Civil-Military Relations," International Political Science Review, 2/3 (1981).  

^ix Herb Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies. Albany: State University of New York, 1999.

^x D.L. Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers Motives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980

^xi Michel Hudson, Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

^xii Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

^xiii James Heaphey, "The Organization ofEgypt," World Politics, 18/2 (January 1966).

^xiv Lary Diamond, "The Quality of Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 15/4 (October 2004).

^xv Larbi Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy.

Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/02/the_egyptian_army_in_politics.html at March 20, 2011 - 04:57:27 PM CDT

John Esposito: Apologist of Islam or Messenger of Islamic Da'wah?

March 06, 2011

John Esposito: Apologist of Islam or Messenger of Islamic Da'wah?

By David Bukay

http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/03/john_esposito_apologist_of_isl.html

[Reproduced here by kind permission of the author]

John Esposito is a professor at Georgetown University and the head of the "Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding."  He is considered one of the foremost apologists of radical Islam in American academia.  The term "apologist" means one who denies events and activities of a group or who uses selective perceptions and cognitive biases to whitewash reality.  However, it is more fitting to view Esposito as a Da'i, or an Islamic propagator who uses Da'wah, the propagation of deceit.

From the very beginning, Islam has been spread by two arms: the violent jihad and the political Da'wah (16:125)i.  Da'wah serves as a diplomatic means of religious legitimization through which to invite all human beings to accept Islam as the only supreme and perfect religion (5:3; 9:33). According to Da'wah, which preaches the message of Allah's infinite wisdom (6:38), it is in humanity's best interest to submit to Islam (7:158; 21:107).  Since Islam is perfect, no one may doubt it, use logic to determine its validity, or judge it by human conceptions (4:115; 5:72-3; 10:69-70; 29:68; 36:64-5).  Any of these transgressions constitutes heresy and warrants the death penalty.

Today, Da'wah has become diplomacy of deceit to mislead the ignorant infidels.  John Esposito, as a Christian professor at a prestigious university, is well-placed to promote Islam by Da'wah. Lately, Esposito has taken to blaming the United States for and exaggerating the indigenous local populations' role in the crisis in the Middle East. In an extreme leftist publication, Esposito deplores the U.S. while praising the Muslim Brotherhood as an apt practitioner of democracy.  In fact, the professor believes that the uprisings have revealed a broad-based, pro-democracy movement not driven by religious extremists and therefore deserving of the U.S.'s support.

These claims are in standing with Esposito's general views and attitudes.  By quoting from his book, What Everybody Needs to Know about Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), we can best understand how he uses the Islamic Da'wah to promote Muslim interests in the West.

First, as to Islam's hostility to other religions, Esposito claims the following (70-73):

Theologically and historically, Islam has a long record of tolerance. Muslims did not try to impose their religion on others or force them to convert[.] ... Muhammad granted freedom of religious thought and practice to the Jews and Christians, setting a precedent for peaceful and cooperative interreligious relations[.] ... Muslims mainstream and extremist, conservative and progressive, struggle to balance the affirmation of the truths of their faith with the cultivation of a pluralism and tolerance rooted in mutual respect and understanding. 

All that remains, then, is to tell this story to the original peoples of the Middle East and North Africa, who were forcibly conquered, Arabized, and Islamizedⁱⁱ.  Consider also the peoples of the Balkans and Eastern Europe who were conquered and enslavedⁱⁱⁱ, the tens of millions of Africans who were likewise subjugated and exterminated^iv, and the 80 million eliminated Buddhists in Asia^v. As for our own generation, Esposito should enlighten the Armenians^vi, not to mention the Christians in Greece, Iraq (Assyrians), Lebanon, Egypt, and especially Southern Sudan.  But perhaps the most eager recipients of this information would be the 10-12 million Muslims massacred in the last 80 years by other Muslims.

On Muslim persecution of Christians in Muslim countries, Esposito states (76-79):

Muslim-Christian relations have deteriorated[.]... from the Crusades and European colonialism to contemporary politics. Indigenous Christians were favored by and benefited from the colonial rule. The product of European missionaries that converted local Muslims[.]... [T]he creation of the state of Israel has contributed to the deterioration of relations and the Christian fundamentalists like Robertson, Graham and Falwell have been the source of intolerance, persecution, violence and terrorism.  

So Christians have brought harmful Islamic behavior upon themselves.  As for the genocide in Sudan, Esposito's reaction is that there is no problem, since "actually the majority of the South is animist and the struggle has been political and economic as much as religious."  The Sudanese victims are animists, not Christians, so there is no problem here.

As to whether Jews and Christians have always been enemies of Islam, Esposito has this to say (79-86):

[T]he Jewish population was granted the right to internal religious and cultural autonomy in exchange for their political loyalty and allegiance to the Muslims. The Jews backed Muhammad's Meccan rivals, judged as traitors for the support of his enemies[.] ... [O]ther Jews became Dhimmis and thrived under the protection of Islam[.] ... [T]he establishment of the State of Israel was a turning point in relations between Muslims and Jews, and severely strained their relations in Muslim countries[.] ... [T]he Muslim conquerors proved to be far more tolerant than Imperial Christianity had been, granting religious freedoms to the indigenous Christian Churches. Pluralism is the essence of Islam as revealed in the Qur'an and practiced by Muhammad and the early caliphs[.] 

The historical facts stand in stark contrast to Esposito's analysis.  Muhammad massacred the Jews of Arabia immediately after his military successes^vii.  At Haybar, the Meccans flouted the Hudaybiyah agreement, massacred the Jews, and took the fertile lands left behind by the dead -- all without any provocation whatsoever.  After the Jews were massacred in Arabia, it was Muhammad's commandment that Jews are not allowed to live any longer in Arabia, ^viii a commandment which was strictly fulfilled till our days. Christians, for their part, are now all but an extinct species in the Middle East.^ix

However, among Esposito's greatest hits is his declaration that "[t]he Ottoman Empire is a prime example of the positive treatment of religious minorities in a Muslim-majority context."  Well, perhaps there were two Ottoman Empires, with one clearly coming from Esposito's imagination.  The original Ottoman Empire has a different history: abusing minorities in the Balkans and Eastern Europe; kidnapping almost a million children and converting them to Islam (devshirme system); bringing millions of slaves and concubines from Eastern Europe, mainly Ukraine and Hungary (Serge Trifkovic, Islam's Wretched Record on Slavery); and massacring Christians, as in the Armenian holocaust and the Greek extermination (to mention only two examples)^x.

Furthermore, Esposito is at his best while analyzing "violence and terrorism" (117-138):

Jihad is struggling against the evil in oneself and to be virtuous and moral. It also includes the right, indeed the obligation, to defend Islam and the community from aggression. Western governments are propping up oppressive regimes and exploiting the region's human and natural resources, robbing Muslims of their culture and to live in a more just society. This is the reason for the use of Jihad. The Qur'an does not advocate or condone terrorism. Muslims are merciful and just. Islam does permit Muslims only to defend themselves and their families, religion and community from aggression.

To prove his point, Esposito quotes from the Qur'an -- 22:39-40; 48:17; 9:91; 2:192; 47:4; 8:61; 4:90.  However, there is only one problem: all of the quoted verses have different meanings and objectives.  Qur'an 22:39-40 was revealed in year 624, while Muhammad was weak and plundering the caravans of Mecca.  However, the tides had turned by 626, when Muhammad was waging aggressive wars against his enemies to conquer Arabia and convert the Arabs to Islam.  Qur'an 48:17 and 9:91 have nothing to do with peace with the unbelievers -- on the contrary, these verses permit believers not to go to war.  

Qur'an 2:192 is connected to 2:190-191, and the two together call upon Muslims to fight unbelievers whenever they are found.  Only if the unbelievers desist (i.e., submit to Islam) is Allah forgiving and kind.

As for Qur'an 47:4, one can only be amazed by Esposito's distortion, as 47:4 is one of the most horrible verses: "when you clash with the unbelievers smite their necks until you overpower them, then hold [those who submit] in bondage. Then either free them graciously or, after taking a ransom, until war shall come to an end [there will be no more unbelievers, or they will submit to Islamic rule]."  

Qur'an 8:61 is the same, for it is tightly connected to verses 8:59-60. The command is to strike terror in the hearts of Allah's enemies and fight them ceaselessly. Only then comes 8:61: "if they are inclined to peace [after submitting to Islam], make peace with them."  

Qur'an 4:90 is connected and conditional to 4:89, which commands the Muslims to "seize the unbelievers wherever they are and do away with them." This establishes the context for 4:90: "accept those who take refuge ... or those who weary of fighting you or their people, come over to you[.]"

It is for Westerners to evaluate how Esposito distorts the Qur'an to suit his political views.  But Esposito's propaganda reaches its highest level when he deals with Qur'an 9:5 and 9:29.  He declares:

[I]n fact however, the full intent of "When the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters whenever you find them" is missed or distorted when quoted in isolation. For it is followed and qualified by "but if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligation and pay the Zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind" (9:5). The same is true for another quoted verse (9:29), which is often cited without the line that follows: "until they pay the tax with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued."

Let's analyze this. Qur'an 9:5 has presents a grim choice: convert to Islam ("but if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligation and pay the Zakat, then let them go their way") or be massacred.  The clause thus becomes rather coercive.  Qur'an 9:29 speaks of submission to Islamic rule via a humiliating tax. Can we assume that Esposito considers all this peaceful and tolerant Islam?

For Esposito's sake, here is an up-to-date list of Qur'anic commandments. Fighting is demanded of the believers (2:216) -- it is jihad in the cause of Allah (2:191; 2:193; 2:244; 8:39; 9:5; 9:73; 47:4; 66:9) against the powers of Satan (4:76), the unbelievers, the hypocrites (9:5; 9:73; 66:9), and the People of the Book (9:29).  The order for the believers is to smite their opponents' necks (47:4; 8:12) and strike terror in their hearts (3:151; 8: 12; 8:60) for the sake of the hereafter (4:74).  (These opponents include the People of the Book [59:2]).  For this, the Mujahid will earn paradise (3:195; 9:72; 13:22-23; 47:4-6), where they will be rewarded with black-eyed virgins (44:51-54; 52:17-20; 56:22-24).  Above all, the believers earn the assurance that they are indeed not dead, but instead staying and living beside Allah (2:154; 3:169-171).

A concise summary of Esposito's views concerning his book, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, can be found in his May 7, 2002 interview with Joanne Myers.  Israel and the U.S. are responsible for all ills in the Middle East: if only the U.S. would withdraw from the Middle East and Israel would disappear, then there would be no problem with radical Islam.  In response to the question concerning Islamic terrorism and jihad around the world, Esposito speaks simply: "Jihad means to be a good Muslim. It means to strive, the effort that it takes to be virtuous, to be a good believer. Jihad also means that in being a good Muslim you have the right and, indeed, the obligation to defend Islam and yourself if you are under siege, the struggle against an unjust government. This is a 'just war.'"  (See also here.)

According to Esposito, Islamic terrorism is not a problem, and instead of dealing with the real issues, Washington bothers itself with nonsense.  Worse, Esposito blames the U.S. for all the evils regarding the Middle East: the rise of Islamic radicalism in the West; the lack of self-determination, democratization, and human rights in the Middle East; the oppression by Arab and Islamic regimes of radical Islamic democratic opposition; and the worsening situation in the Arab and Islamic lands in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

John Esposito is happy to hold and express these opinions.  For his part, he believes that he "represents an alternative school of thought within American academia -- what America is truly about, free speech, open dialogue, and a multiplicity of views."  One can only hope that Esposito's opponents similarly capitalize on America's free speech to set the story straight.

David Bukay, Ph.D. is at the School of Political Science, the University of Haifa.

Notes

ⁱ Muhammad Ibn Isma`il, al-Bukhari, Saheeh al-Bukhari, Lahore: Kazi, 1979, vol. 2 nos. 291-301. Ibn al-Hajjaj Muslim, Saheeh Muslim, Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-Misri, n.d, Book 019, no. 4294.

ⁱⁱ Reuven Firestone. Jihad-The Origin of Holy War in Islam, Oxford University Press, 1999.

ⁱⁱⁱ Paul Fregosi, Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries.

^iv Peter Hammond,  Slavery, Terrorism and Islam: The Historical Roots and Contemporary Threat

^v Ali Muhammad Khan, Islamic Jihad: a Forced Conversion, Imperialism and Slavery. New York: Universe, 2009. Sita Ram Goel, The Story of Islamic Imperialism in India, New Delhi: Voice of India, 1994.

^vi Vahakn Dadrian, The Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification, Cambridge, MA, 1999. Vahakn Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide. Providence: Bergahn Books, 1997.

^vii Elias al-Maqdisi and Sam Solomon, al-Yahud: Eternal Islamic Enmity and the Jews. Charlottesville,Va., ANM Publishers, 2010. 

^viii Sahih Bukhari, vol. 5, book 59, nos, 362, 392; Sahih Muslim, vol. 10, no. 3763.

^ix Andrew Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of the Non-Muslims. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books 2005.

^x Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam, Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985. Speros Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor. Berkeley: California University Press, 1971. Ehud Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.